Jay C. Hartzell

Learn More
Due to institutional investors' increasing ownership and interest in corporate governance, we hypothesize that the presence of institutional investors is associated with certain executive compensation structures. We find a significantly negative relation between the level of compensation and the concentration of institutional ownership, suggesting that(More)
U.S. corporations hold significant amounts of cash on their balance sheets, and these cash holdings have been justified in the existing empirical literature by transaction costs and precautionary motives. An additional explanation, considered in this study, is that U.S. multinational firms hold cash in their foreign subsidiaries because of the tax costs(More)
We study benefits received by target CEOs in completed mergers and acquisitions. Certain target CEOs negotiate large cash payments in the form of special bonuses or increases in golden parachutes. These negotiated cash payments are positively associated with the CEO’s prior excess compensation and negatively associated with the likelihood that the CEO(More)
  • Henrik Cronqvist, Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, +12 authors Frank Fang Yu
  • 2007
Employing a new blockholder-firm panel data set in which we can track large shareholders across firms and over time, we find that firms’ investment, financial, operational, and executive compensation policies vary with the particular blockholder present in a firm. The effects are strongest for activists, pension funds, and corporations, and weakest for(More)
A change in executive leadership is a significant event in the life of a firm. This study investigates an important consequence of a CEO turnover: a change in equity volatility. We develop three hypotheses about how changes in CEO might affect stock price volatility, and test these hypotheses using a sample of 872 CEO turnovers over the 1979-95 period. We(More)
We provide arguments and present evidence that corporate governance structures are composed of interrelated mechanisms, which are in turn endogenous responses to the costs and benefits firms face when they choose those mechanisms. Examining board structures and the use of corporate charter provisions in a sample of more than 2,300 firms over a four-year(More)
CEOs with large networks earn more than those with smaller networks. An additional connection to an executive or director outside the firm increases compensation by over $17,000 on average, and accounts for about 10% of total pay. An additional premium is associated with “important” members: insiders at other firms (especially large ones), geographically(More)
This paper investigates whether there are systematic differences between the forecasting style and abilities of female and male analysts, and whether market participants recognize these differences. My key conjecture is that only female analysts with superior forecasting abilities enter the profession due to a perception of discrimination in the analyst(More)
We provide arguments and present evidence that corporate governance structures are endogenous responses to the costs and benefits firms face when they choose the mechanisms that comprise those structures. In particular, an industry’s investment opportunities, product uniqueness, competitive environment, information environment, and leverage help explain its(More)