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Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility
Philosophers working in the nascent field of ‘experimental philosophy’ have begun using methods borrowed from psychology to collect data about folk intuitions concerning debates ranging from actionExpand
Is Incompatibilism Intuitive
Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism isExpand
The phenomenology of free will
Philosophers often suggest that their theories of free will are sup- ported by our phenomenology. Just as their theories conflict, their descriptions of the phenomenology of free will often conflictExpand
Are the folk agent-causationists?
:  Experimental examination of how the folk conceptualize certain philosophically loaded notions can provide information useful for philosophical theorizing. In this paper, we explore issues raisedExpand
Strong And Weak Possibility
The thesis of existentialism holds that if a proposition p exists and predicates something of an object a, then in any world where a does not exist, p does not exist either. If “possibly, p” entailsExpand
Can We Do without Fundamental Individuals ?
According to qualitativism, individuals aren’t ‘primitive’, or fundamental; all fundamental facts are purely qualitative. Some reasons to believe it are narrowly scientific, stemming from (forExpand
The Lexile Framework for Reading: An Introduction to What It Is and How to Use It
The Lexile® Framework for Reading is a scientific approach to reading and text measurement. There are two Lexile measures: the Lexile reader measure and the Lexile text measure. A Lexile readerExpand
The Facts in Logical Space: A Tractarian Ontology
Curbing Enthusiasm About Grounding
Metaphysics in the high old style is back in fashion, and this season’s favorite accessory is a relation philosophers are pleased to call metaphysical grounding. By ‘grounding’, the fashionistas doExpand
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