Janet T. Landa

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Applying the economic theory of clubs to the biological literature on schooling fish, this paper develops a 'selfish fish' club-theoretic paradigm of why fish join a fish school, and arrive at the following conclusions. A selfish fish: (a) joins the fish school because it derives hydrodynamic benefits (a club good); the selfish fish is a 'quasi-free rider';(More)
Economists draw important lessons for modern development from the medieval Maghribi traders who, it has been argued, enforced contracts collectively through a closed, private-order coalition. We show that this view is untenable. Not a single empirical example adduced as evidence of the putative coalition shows that any coalition actually existed.(More)
The present article focuses on the conditions that allow governments to increase property rights protection because they expect enough income from such action. We develop a behavioral explanation, according to which the answer lies in the growth in the importance, size, and wealth of merchant guilds in the medieval era in Western Europe as well as a(More)
Our aim in this paper is to look at graph-theoretic and coalition-formation approaches to the development of exchange networks among spatially separated traders. In particular, we shall show: (1) That decentralized trading structures involving bilateral trading with left-hand and righthand neighbors in a connected ring can, for a certain specified spatial(More)
In order to assess the benefits of a Nutritional Team in our hospital, the Nutritional Committee made a prospective study concerning the Parenteral Nutrition application between June 8th and July 23rd 1992. We studied 94 patients, mean age 51.5 (0-88). They had 918 nutritional units (20 NU/day) for a mean time of 13.2 days. The main nutritional indication(More)
This paper considers the emergence and evolution of punitive and compensatory remedies in ancient law. I describe how ancient practices of retaliation gradually evolved, through four general phases, into rules requiring victim’s compensation. I suggest that the Biblical lex talionis (“eye for an eye ... life for a life”) and similar rules that emerged in(More)
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