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We consider the problem of selecting fair divisions of a heterogeneous divisible good among a set of agents. Recent work (Cohler et al., AAAI 2011) focused on designing algorithms for computing maxsum—social welfare maximizing—allocations under the fairness notion of envy-freeness. Maxsum allocations can also be found under alternative notions such as(More)
It is well known that strategic behavior in elections is essentially unavoidable; we therefore ask: how bad can the rational outcome be? We answer this question via the notion of the price of anarchy, using the scores of alternatives as a proxy for their quality and bounding the ratio between the score of the optimal alternative and the score of the winning(More)
Several recent security-typed programming languages, such as Aura, PCML5, and Fine, allow programmers to express and enforce access control and information flow policies. In this paper, we show that security-typed programming can be embedded as a library within a general-purpose dependently typed programming language, Agda. Our library, Aglet, accounts for(More)
We consider the problem of implementing an individually rational, asymptotically Pareto optimal allocation in a barter-exchange economy where agents are endowed with goods and preferences over the goods of others, but may not use money as a medium of exchange. Because one of the most important instantiations of such economies is kidney exchange -- where the(More)
We introduce single-bid auctions as a new format for combinatorial auctions. In single-bid auctions, each bidder submits a single real-valued bid for the right to buy items at a fixed price. Contrary to other simple auction formats, such as simultaneous or sequential single-item auctions, bidders can implement no-regret learning strategies for single-bid(More)
Walrasian equilibrium prices have a remarkable property: they allow each buyer to purchase a bundle of goods that she finds the most desirable, while guaranteeing that the induced allocation over all buyers will globally maximize social welfare. However, this clean story has two caveats. * First, the prices may induce indifferences. In fact, the minimal(More)
Auction theory traditionally assumes that bidders' valuation distributions are known to the auctioneer , such as in the celebrated, revenue-optimal Myerson auction [Myerson, 1981]. However, this theory does not describe how the auctioneer comes to possess this information. Recently, Cole and Roughgarden [2014] showed that an approximation based on a finite(More)