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Malapportionment of seats in bicameral legislatures, it is widely argued, confers disproportionate bene¯ts to overrepresented jurisdictions. Ample empirical research has documented that unequal representation produces unequal distribution of government expenditures in bicameral legislatures. The theoretical foundations for this empirical pattern are weak.(More)
This paper examines the e®ects of party control of state governments on the distribution of intergovernmental transfers across counties from 1957 to 1997. We ¯nd that the governing parties skew the distribution of funds in favor of areas that provide them with the strongest electoral support. This is borne out two ways. (1) Counties that traditionally give(More)
We examine the relationship between parliamentary seats and cabinet posts in European governments between 1946 and 2001. Our speci¯cation improves on past studies in two respects. First, it derives and uses the voting weights of the underlying coalition formation games. This reduces the measurement error introduced when seat shares are used to proxy for(More)
I guess you're right on the economics, but those taxes were never a problem of economics. They are politics all the way through. We put those payroll contributions there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect their pensions and their unemployment benefits. With those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my(More)
Using a new data set, we estimate the magnitude of the incumbency advantage in primary elections between 1910 to 2000. We ¯nd that an incumbency advantage, as estimated by the sophomore surge, of above 5 percentage points existed in primary elections even in the ¯rst decades of the twentieth century. The incumbency advantage in the primaries grew to(More)
We develop a rationale for position-taking preferences in legislatures using a formal model of legislative vote-buying and elections. In our model, citizens and an interest group are motivated by policy, while legislators are motivated by holding office. The group may attempt to buy legislators' votes by offering contracts based on their votes. If citizens(More)