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Direct voting and proxy voting
An axiomatic argument for a hybrid of direct democracy and representative democracy in which each citizen may vote directly on each issue, or delegate his vote on any issue to a representative (that is, a proxy) of his own choosing is constructed.
Four Condorcet-Hare Hybrid Methods for Single-Winner Elections
This paper examines four single-winner election methods, denoted here as Woodall, Benham, Smith-AV, and Tideman, that all make use of both Condorcet’s pairwise comparison principle and Hare’s
Statistical evaluation of voting rules
This work generates synthetic elections using two sources of survey data, two spatial models, and two standard models from the voting literature to test whether each of 54 voting rules is non-manipulable, and efficient in the sense of maximizing summed utilities.
Strategic voting and nomination
The fraction of elections in which sincere voting is a core equilibrium given each of eight single-winner voting rules is estimated, and Hare is least vulnerable to strategic voting in general, whereas Borda, Coombs, approval, and range are most vulnerable.
Selecting the runoff pair
Although two-round voting procedures are common, the theoretical voting literature rarely discusses any such rules beyond the traditional plurality runoff rule. Therefore, using four criteria in
Why majoritarian election methods should be Condorcet-efficient
This paper introduces a new Condorcet-efficient voting method that uses ordinal information to determine the direction of pairwise defeats, and cardinal information to determine the strength of
Progressive and Regressive Equilibria in a Tax Competition Game
This article models interjurisdictional competition over nonlinear taxes on the incomes of mobile individuals. Each individual has exogenous wealth and a location preference that is drawn from a