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The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation
We exploit differences in the mortality rates faced by European colonialists to estimate the effect of institutions on economic performance. Our argument is that Europeans adopted very different
Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth
This paper develops the empirical and theoretical case that differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic development. We first document the empirical
Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty
In the West are the 'haves', while much of the rest of the world are the 'have-nots'. The extent of inequality today is unprecedented. Drawing on an extraordinary range of contemporary and historical
Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution
A method and apparatus for the removal of cakes from an open filter press is proposed which involves directing one or more jets of a pressure fluid towards the chamber to impinge on an edge of the
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political
A Theory of Political Transitions
We develop a theory of political transitions inspired in part by the experiences of Western Europe and Latin America. Nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite. The initially
Democracy Does Cause Growth
We provide evidence that democracy has a positive effect on GDP per capita. Our dynamic panel strategy controls for country fixed effects and the rich dynamics of GDP, which otherwise confound the
Income and Democracy?
Existing studies establish a strong cross-country correlation between income and democracy but do not control for factors that simultaneously affect both variables. We show that controlling for such
Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions
We construct a model of simultaneous change and persistence in institutions. The model consists of landowning elites and workers, and the key economic decision concerns the form of economic
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