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Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments
Abstract Theory suggests that shareholders who own blocks of stock have a stronger incentive to invest in voting on corporate issues than nonblockholders. Our evidence indicates that institutionalExpand
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Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board
Shareholder activists and regulators are pressuring U.S. firms to separate the titles of CEO and Chairman of the Board. They argue that separating the titles will reduce agency costs in corporationsExpand
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The choice of organizational form The case of franchising
Evaluates the agency problems associated with company owned versus franchised units in order to determine whether these agency considerations affect the own/franchise decision. Information on theExpand
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Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills
We find that the average stock-market reaction to announcements of poison pills is positive when the board has a majority of outside directors and negative when it does not. The probability that aExpand
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Stock-based incentive compensation and investment behavior
Abstract This paper examines how excessive concern over current stock price can motivate managers to use observable investment decisions to manipulate the market's inferences about the firm. TheExpand
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What Happens to CEOs After They Retire? New Evidence on Career Concerns, Horizon Problems, and CEO Incentives
This paper provides evidence on a previously unidentified source of managerial incentives: concerns about post-retirement board service. Both the likelihood that a retired CEO serves on his own boardExpand
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Empirical research on CEO turnover and firm-performance: a discussion
Engel/Hayes/Wang and Farrell/Whidbee provide new evidence on how firms weight alternative performance measures in making CEO retention and replacement decisions. While their results are statisticallyExpand
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Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture
PART 1: Basic Concepts Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: Economists' View of Behavior Chapter 3: Markets, Organizations, and the Role of Knowledge PART 2: Managerial Economics Chapter 4: DemandExpand
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Shareholder wealth, information signaling and the specially designated dividend: An empirical study☆
Abstract This paper examines common stock returns and dividend and earnings patterns surrounding specially designated dividends labeled by management as ‘extra’, ‘special’ or ‘year-end’ and comparesExpand
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The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980
C orporate takeovers have been very big business in the 1980s. The Office of the Chief Economist (OCE) of the Securities and Exchange Commission estimates that shareholders of target firms inExpand
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