• Publications
  • Influence
Job Destruction and Propagation of Shocks
We develop and quantitatively implement a dynamic general equilibrium model with labor" market matching and endogenous job destruction. The model produces a close match with data on" job creation andExpand
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Liquidity Flows and Fragility of Business Enterprises
This paper develops a macroeconomic model in which investable assets flow to entrepreneurs through long-term relationships with lenders. Low asset flows cause relationships to break up due toExpand
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Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design
In this short paper, we show how hard evidence can be incorporated into the mechanism-design framework. We model the parties' inalienable decisions (evidence production) as distinct from anExpand
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Strategy : An Introduction to Game Theory
TLDR
Joel Watson has refined his successful text to make it even more student-friendly. Expand
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Contractual Fragility, Job Destruction, and Business Cycles
We develop a theory of labor contracting in which negative productivity shocks lead to costly job loss, despite unlimited possibilities for renegotiating wage contracts. Such fragile contracts emergeExpand
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Job Destruction and the Experiences of Displaced Workers
This paper evaluates a class of endogenous job destruction models based on how well they explain the observed experiences of displaced workers. We show that pure reallocation models in whichExpand
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Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game Forms
We propose a notion of conditional dominance for games whose representations designate information sets. We prove that iterated conditional dominance is equivalent to extensive formExpand
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Starting Small and Commitment
  • J. Watson
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • Games Econ. Behav.
  • 1 April 1999
TLDR
I study a model of a long-term partnership with two-sided incomplete information. Expand
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Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information
I study alternating-offer bargaining games with two-sided incomplete information about the players' discount rates. For both perfect Bayesian equilibrium and a rationalizability-style notion, IExpand
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Network Intermediaries in International Trade
Motivated by evidence on the importance of incomplete information and networks in international trade, we investigate the supply of network intermediation. We build a general-equilibrium model inExpand
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