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Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World
Abbreviations Chapter 1: External Object Foundationalism 1.1The Problem of the External World 1.2 Metaphysical and Epistemological Direct Realisms 1.3 Basic Beliefs Chapter 2: Doxastic andExpand
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CIRCULARITY, RELIABILITY, AND THE COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY OF PERCEPTION
Is perception cognitively penetrable, and what are the epistemological consequences if it is? I address the latter of these two questions, partly by reference to recent work by AthanassiosExpand
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Carving the Mind at its (Not Necessarily Modular) Joints
  • J. Lyons
  • Computer Science
  • The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 1 June 2001
TLDR
The cognitive enuropsychological understanding of a cognitive system is roughly that of a ‘mental organ’, which is independent of other systems, specializes in some cognitive task, and exhibits a certain kind of internal cohesiveness. Expand
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Evidence, experience, and externalism
The Sellarsian dilemma is a famous argument that attempts to show that nondoxastic experiential states cannot confer justification on basic beliefs. The usual conclusion of the Sellarsian dilemma isExpand
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Perception and Basic Beliefs
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Epistemological Problems of Perception
The central problem in the epistemology of perception is that of explaining how perception could give us knowledge of an external world. Although this is a perfectly intelligible and pressingExpand
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Perceptual Belief and Nonexperiential Looks
How things look (or sound, taste, smell, etc.) plays two important roles in the epistemology of perception. 1 First, our perceptual beliefs are episte-mically justified, at least in part, in virtueExpand
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Perception and Virtue Reliabilism
In some recent work, Ernest Sosa rejects the “perceptual model” of rational intuition, according to which intuitive beliefs (e.g., that $$ 2 + 2 = 4 $$) are justified by standing in the appropriateExpand
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Experiential evidence?
Much of the intuitive appeal of evidentialism results from conflating two importantly different conceptions of evidence. This is most clear in the case of perceptual justification, where experienceExpand
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General Rules and the Justification of Probable Belief in Hume's Treatise
By the conclusion of Book I of the Treatise, Hume faces something of a dilemma. Because of the skeptical arguments of part 4, he is "ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon noExpand
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