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Incumbent Behavior : Vote-Seeking , Tax-Setting , and Yardstick Competition
This paper develops a model of the political economy of tax-setting in a multijurisdictional world, where voters' choices and incumbent behavior are determined simultaneously. Voters are assumed toExpand
The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics
We examine what determines whether an interest group will receive favors in pork-barrel politics, using a model of majority voting with two competing parties. Each group's membership is heterogeneousExpand
Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power
The transfer of power through the use of military force is a commonplace event in world affairs. Although no two coups d'etat are alike, they all have a common denominator: poverty. We analyzeExpand
The political process often compensates the losers from technical change or international competition in an economically inefficient way, namely by subsidizing or protecting declining industriesExpand
Ideology, Tactics and E ciency in Redistributive Politics
We model the electoral politics of redistribution. Taxation has efficiency and equity effects. Citizens and parties care about inequality in addition to their private concerns for consumption andExpand
A Model of the Political Economy of the United States
We develop and test a model of joint determination of the rate of economic growth and the results of presidential and Congressional elections in the United States. In our model, economic agents andExpand
Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile
Acknowledgements Introduction 1. Ideology and valence 2. Accident and force 3. Legislative institutions in the constitution of 1980 4. Roll-call votes and senate committees 5. The Labor committee 6.Expand
Fiscal federalism and redistributive politics
Abstract We consider the interaction between redistributive politics at central and local levels in a federal system, and characterize the factors influencing success in redistributive politics inExpand
Estimating Legislators' Preferred Points
This paper shows that agnostic spatial models that simultaneously attempt to estimate legislators' preferred points and ideological locations for the proposals on which they vote, such as theExpand
Does High Income Promote Democracy?
The authors construct a statistical model with which to test whether the regularity that democracy is more commonly found among wealthy countries stems from a democratizing effect of high income orExpand