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Straightforward Elections, Unanimity, and Phantom Voters
Non-manipulable direct revelation social choice functions are characterized for societies where the space of alternatives is a euclidean space and all voters have separable star-shaped preferencesExpand
Pillage and property
  • J. Jordan
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • J. Econ. Theory
  • 1 November 2006
A class of coalitional games, called pillage games, are introduced, as a model of Hobbesian anarchy, where any coalition can pillage, costlessly and with certainty, any less powerful coalition. Expand
Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria
This paper discusses three problems that can prevent the convergence of learning mechanisms to mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. First, while players′ expectations may converge to a mixed equilibrium,Expand
Bayesian learning in normal form games
Abstract This paper studies myopic Bayesian learning processes for finite-player, finite-strategy normal form games. Initially, each player is presumed to know his own payoff function but not theExpand
The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely
Abstract This paper establishes that the competitive allocation process is the only informationally decentralized mechanism for exchange environments which (i) achieves Pareto optimal allocations;Expand
The Existence of Rational Expectations Equilibrium: A Retrospective: Essays in Economic Analysis, A Tribute to Roy Radn
This paper provides a selective review of theoretical research on the consistency of rational expectations equilibrium and its properties in microeconomic models. The general equilibrium framework isExpand
Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games
Abstract This paper studies repeated games with a finite number of players, a finite number of actions, discounted payoffs, and perfect recall. The players′ initial expectations are given by a commonExpand
The generic existence of rational expectations equilibrium in the higher dimensional case
Abstract The study of the generic existence of rational expectations equilibrium has concentrated on three cases, according to whether the space of “states of private information” has dimension lessExpand
Stable sets in majority pillage games
This paper characterizes thestable sets of two and three-player games, and the symmetric (permutation invariant) stable sets of games with more than three players, and finds the stable set for two or three players is unique, and for any odd number of players, the symmetrical stable set is unique and equal to the unique symmetricstable set for the classic majority game. Expand