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Knowledge and Lotteries
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Deeply Contingent A Priori Knowledge
0.1 In 'Reference and Contingency," Gareth Evans distinguished between 'superficially contingent' and 'deeply contingent' truths. A true sentence is superficially contingent just in case the functionExpand
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Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding
We pose and resolve several vexing decision theoretic puzzles. Some are variants of existing puzzles, such as ‘Trumped’ (Arntzenius and McCarthy 1997), ‘Rouble trouble’ (Arntzenius and Barrett 1999),Expand
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The Real Guide to Fake Barns: A Catalogue of Gifts for Your Epistemic Enemies
Perhaps the concept of knowledge, prior to its being fashioned and molded by certain philosophical traditions, never offered any stable negative verdict in the original fake barn case.
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Semantic Plasticity and Speech Reports
Most meanings we express belong to large families of variant meanings, among which it would be implausible to suppose that some are much more apt for being expressed than others. This abundance ofExpand
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Freedom in Context
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Conceivability and Possibility
1. Introduction 2. Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance 3. Berkeley's Puzzle 4. Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? 5. Desire in Imagination 6. Essentialism versus Essentialism 7.Expand
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Belief is weak
It is tempting to posit an intimate relationship between belief and assertion. The speech act of assertion seems like a way of transferring the speaker’s belief to his or her audience. If this isExpand
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Chance and Counterfactuals1
Suppose the world is chancy. The worry arises that most ordinary counterfactuals are false. This paper examines David Lewis' strategy for rescuing such counterfactuals, and argues that it is highlyExpand
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Assertion, Context, and Epistemic Accessibility
We present a problem for Stalnaker's meta-semantic framework, by challenging the plausibility of the Uniformity principle. Expand
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