• Publications
  • Influence
On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing
TLDR
We study the problem of pricing items for sale to consumers so as to maximize the seller's revenue by finding envy-free prices that maximize seller profit and at the same time are envy free. Expand
  • 323
  • 55
  • PDF
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
TLDR
We consider the classical mathematical economics problem of Bayesian optimal mechanism design where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-interested agents with preferences drawn from a known distribution. Expand
  • 348
  • 46
  • PDF
Optimal marketing strategies over social networks
We discuss the use of social networks in implementing viral marketing strategies. While influence maximization has been studied in this context (see Chapter 24 of [10]), we study revenueExpand
  • 358
  • 31
  • PDF
Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations
TLDR
Algorithmic pricing is the computational problem that sellers (e.g., supermarkets) face when trying to set prices for their items to maximize their profit in the presence of a known demand. Expand
  • 243
  • 27
  • PDF
Competitive auctions
TLDR
We study a class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for an item in unlimited supply, such as a digital good, for which we give competitive auctions. Expand
  • 201
  • 24
  • PDF
Competitive auctions and digital goods
TLDR
We study a class of single round, sealed bid auctions for items in unlimited supply such as digital goods. Expand
  • 278
  • 20
  • PDF
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
  • 102
  • 18
Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction
TLDR
We study an abstract optimal auction problem for selecting a subset of self-interested agents to whom to provide a service. Expand
  • 96
  • 13
  • PDF
Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
TLDR
We consider the problem of designing mechanisms with the incentive property that no coalition of agents can engage in a collusive strategy that results in an increase in the combined utility of the coalition. Expand
  • 90
  • 12
  • PDF
Competitiveness via consensus
TLDR
We introduce Consensus Revenue Estimate (CORE) auctions, a class of competitive revenue-maximizing auctions that is interesting for several reasons. Expand
  • 53
  • 12
  • PDF