• Publications
  • Influence
Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions
This paper reports the results of a private-values auction experiment in which expected costs of deviating from the Nash equilibrium bidding function are asymmetric, with the implication that upwardExpand
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A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games
Abstract We formalize an equilibrium model in which altruism and decision-error parameters determine the distribution of contributions for linear and quadratic public goods games. The equilibriumExpand
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Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values
The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour.Expand
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A model of noisy introspection
We present a theoretical model of noisy introspection designed to explain behavior in games played only once. The model determines layers of beliefs about others’ beliefs about ..., etc., but allowsExpand
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Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler's Dilemma?
The notion of a Nash equilibrium has joined supply and demand as one of the two or three techniques that economists instinctively try to use first in the analysis of economic interactions. Moreover,Expand
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How (Not) to Raise Money
We show that standard winner-pay auctions are inept fund-raising mechanisms because of the positive externality bidders forgo if they top another's high bid. Revenues are suppressed as a result andExpand
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Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality: An Analysis of the All-Pay Auction
The winner-take-all nature of all-pay auctions makes the outcome sensitive to decision errors, which we introduce with a logit formulation. The equilibrium bid distribution is a fixed point: theExpand
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Efficiency in auctions with Private and Common Values
This discussion has resulted in a publication in the American Economic Review , 2002, 92(3), 625-43. Auctions are generally not efficient when the object's expected value depends on private andExpand
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Private costs and public benefits: unraveling the effects of altruism and noisy behavior
An increase in the common marginal value of a public good has two effects: it increases the benefit of a contribution to others, and it reduces the net cost of making a contribution. These twoExpand
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Bidding for the future: signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
  • J. Goeree
  • Computer Science, Economics
  • J. Econ. Theory
  • 1 February 2003
Abstract This paper considers auctions where bidders compete for an advantage in future strategic interactions. When bidders wish to exaggerate their private information, equilibrium biddingExpand
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