• Publications
  • Influence
The Modularity of mind. An essay on faculty psychology
  • J. Fodor
  • Psychology, Biology
  • 23 January 1986
This monograph synthesizes current information from the various fields of cognitive science in support of a new theory of mind that postulates a vertical and modular psychological organization underlying biologically coherent behaviours.
The Language of Thought
  • J. Fodor
  • Psychology, Philosophy
  • 1 March 1980
In a compelling defense of the speculative approach to the philosophy of mind, Jerry Fodor argues that, while our best current theories of cognitive psychology view many higher processes as
Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis)
  • J. Fodor
  • Philosophy
  • 1 October 1974
A typical thesis of positivistic philosophy of science is that all true theories in the special sciences should reduce to physical theories in the long run. This is intended to be an empirical
The Mind Doesn't Work That Way : The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology
In this engaging book, Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and that the
Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong
1. Philosophical Introduction: The Background Theory. 2. Unphilosophical Introduction: What Concepts Have To Be. 3. The Demise of Definitions, Part I: The Linguist's Tale. 4. The Demise of
The structure of a semantic theory
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Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology
  • J. Fodor
  • Psychology, Philosophy
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • 1 March 1980
Abstract The paper explores the distinction between two doctrines, both of which inform theory construction in much of modern cognitive psychology: the representational theory of mind and the
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind
  • J. Fodor
  • Psychology, Philosophy
  • 1 December 1988
Psychosemantics explores the relation between commonsense psychological theories and problems that are central to semantics and the philosophy of language. Building on and extending Fodor's earlier