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Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers, and Shrieks: Singularities and Acausalities in Relativistic Spacetimes
- J. Earman
- Philosophy
- 2 November 1995
1. Introducing Spacetime Singularities and Acausalities 2. Defining, Characterizing, and Proving the Existence 3. Cosmic Censorship 4. Supertasks 5. The Big Bang and the Horizon Problem 6. Time…
A Primer on Determinism
- J. Earman
- Education
- 1986
Though modest in not trying to reach beyond an introductory level of analysis, the work is decidedly immodest in trying to change a number of misimpressions that pervade the philosophical literature.
What Price Spacetime Substantivalism? The Hole Story
- J. Earman, J. Norton
- Philosophy, PhysicsThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- 1 December 1987
Spacetime substantivalism leads to a radical form of indeterminism within a very broad class of spacetime theories which include our best spacetime theory, general relativity. Extending an argument…
Bayes or Bust?-A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.
- L. G. Neuberg, J. Earman
- Philosophy
- 1 April 1994
Bayes' Bayesianism the machinery of modern Bayesianism success stories challenges met the problem of old evidence the rationality and objectivity of scientific inference a plea for eliminative…
An Attempt to Add a Little Direction to "The Problem of the Direction of Time"
- J. Earman
- PhilosophyPhilosophy of Science
- 1 March 1974
It is argued that the main problem with "the problem of the direction of time" is to figure out what the problem is or is supposed to be. Towards this end, an attempt is made to disentangle and to…
Forever Is a Day: Supertasks in Pitowsky and Malament-Hogarth Spacetimes
The standard theory of computation excludes computations whose completion requires an infinite number of steps. Malament-Hogarth spacetimes admit observers whose pasts contain entire future-directed,…
The “Past Hypothesis”: Not even false
- J. Earman
- Physics
- 1 September 2006
CETERIS PARIBUS, THERE IS NO PROBLEM OF PROVISOS
- J. Earman, John T. Roberts
- PhilosophySynthese
- 1 March 1999
It is argued that the (purported) laws of fundamental physics are not hedged by ceteris paribus clauses and provisos and it is shown that not only is there no persuasive analysis of the truth conditions for ceters paribus laws, there is not even an acceptable account of how they are to be saved from triviality or how to be melded with standard scientific methodology.
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