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Russell and Maccoll : Reply to Grattan-Guinness, WoleŃski, and Read
In the December 1999 special edition of Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic on Hugh MacColl, Ivor Grattan-Guinness and Jan Wolenski describe my discussions of Russell and MacColl in superficiallyExpand
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T his essay addresses Michael Dummett’s paper, “The Context Principle: Centre of Frege’s Philosophy” (1995), in which Dummett revises his thinking on Frege. I shall argue that Dummett’s semanticExpand
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Quine : whither empirical equivalence ?
Preferant la theorie de l'equivalence empirique developpee par Russell, l'A. critique le naturalisme de Quine affirmant de facon incomplete que les theories T1 et T2 sont empiriquement equivalentes,Expand
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Propositional Functions and Possible Worlds
Frege: Existence Defined as Identifiability
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The ontological foundation of Russell's theory of modality
Prominent thinkers such as Kripke and Rescher hold that Russell has no modal logic, even that Russell was indisposed toward modal logic. In Part I, I show that Russell had a modal logic which heExpand
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Are the Natural Numbers Just any Progression? Peano, Russell
Are the natural numbers just any progression? It is widely held that Peano and Quine say yes, Russell no. For Russell criticizes Peano, and Peano and Quine criticize Russell. The paper has fourExpand
Russell's Robust Sense of Reality: A Reply to Butchvarov
This paper is a reply to Professor Panayot Butchvarov's recent article entitled "Our Robust Sense of Reality". 1 Critical of Russell from a Meinongian viewpoint, Butchvarov raises a deep ontologicalExpand
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