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Belief's Own Ethics
The fundamental question of the ethics of belief is "What ought one to believe?" According to the traditional view of evidentialism, the strength of one's beliefs should be proportionate to theExpand
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Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences.
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Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating
A travers l'exemple du mensonge d'Abraham au roi Abimelek dans la «Genese», 20, l'A. evalue la these traditionnelle de la preference morale pour la tromperie intentionnelle plutot que pour leExpand
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Abstraction is Uncooperative
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Testimony, trust, knowing
L'A. s'interroge sur la place tenue par la croyance aux temoignages dans la connaissance, y compris la connaissance scientifique. Il construit son etude sur une analyse comparative de Reid, pour quiExpand
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Is the Generality Problem too General
Reliabilism holds that knowledge is true belief reliably caused. Reliabilists should say something about individuating processes; critics deny that the right degree of generality can be specifiedExpand
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RELIABILIST JUSTIFICATION (OR KNOWLEDGE) AS A GOOD TRUTH‐RATIO
Fair lotteries offer familiar ways to pose a number of epistemo- logical problems, prominently those of closure and of scepticism. Although these problems apply to many epistemological positions, inExpand
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Are Conductive Arguments Possible?
Conductive Arguments are held to be defeasible, non-conclusive, and neither inductive nor deductive (Blair and Johnson in Conductive argument: An overlooked type of defeasible reasoning. College,Expand
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Reconciling Open-Mindedness and Belief
Can one be open-minded about a strongly held belief? I defend a reconciliation of the suggested conflict that turns on open-mindedness as an educational aim subordinate to the aim of knowledge, andExpand
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