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We consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object. The seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables, and each individual's valuation is unknown to the other. We characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are Bayesian incentive compatible and individually(More)
We identify and analyze a class of economies with asymmetric information that we call quasi-complete. For quasi-complete economies we determine equilibrium trades, show that the set of fully informative equilibria is a singleton, and give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partially informative equi-libria. Besides unifying some(More)
  • Srinivasan Balakrishnan, Birger Wernerfelt, Srlnlvasan Balakrishnan, J L Kellogg
  • 2007
Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that(More)
This paper o®ers a new equilibrium concept for ¯nite normal form games motivated by the idea that players may have preferences which display uncertainty aversion. More speci¯cally, it adopts the representation of preferences presented in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Then an equilibrium with uncertainty aversion is de¯ned and applied to a number of simple(More)
This paper analyzes the effects of moral hazard on long-run consumption or utility. Given exponential utility, it is shown that the utility of those with unobservable endowments becomes arbitrarily negative as long as any positive fraction of otherwise identical agents have observable endowments. Next, it is shown that assuming a finite number of agents(More)
Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that(More)
  • Claes Fornell, William T Robinson, Birger Wernerfelt, J L Kellogg
  • 2007
Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that(More)
This paper analyzes two equivalent equilibrium notions under asymmetric information: risk neutral rational expectations equilibria (rn-REE), and common knowledge equilibria. We show that the set of fully informative rn-REE is a singleton, and we provide necessary and sucient conditions for the existence of partially informative rn-REE. In a companion paper(More)
Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that(More)
SUMMARY Using the technique of Wan and Davis, we give an existence theorem for a Nash equilibrium point in N-person non-zero sum stochastic jump differential games. lt is shown that if the Nash condition (generalized Isaacs condition) holds there is a Nash equilibrium point in feedback srrategies. We ertend the results to other solution concepts and discuss(More)