J. H. Sheng

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Rights © 2000 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE. This material(More)
This paper empirically studies portfolio manager compensation structures in the U.S. mutual fund industry. Using a unique hand-collected dataset on over 4,000 mutual funds, we find that about three-quarters of portfolio managers receive explicit performance-based incentives from the investment advisors. Our cross-sectional investigation suggests that(More)
This study examines the effects of portfolio manager ownership on the risk-taking behavior of mutual funds. Using both return-based and holding-based risk measures, we find that funds managed by portfolio managers with higher beneficial ownership exhibit lower risk. In particular, using holding-based risk-shifting measure and a difference-indifferences(More)
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