J. B. Lyons

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This book proposes a theory of the distribution of adverbial adjuncts in a Principles and Parameters framework, claiming that there are few syntactic principles specific to adverbials; rather, for the most part, adverbials adjoin freely to any projection. Adjuncts' possible hierarchical positions are determined by whether they can receive a proper(More)
Several years ago, Jerry Fodor (1984) argued that the modularity of the perceptual systems was good news for epistemology. In particular, on the assumption that perceptual systems are modular in his (1983) sense of the term, they are informationally encapsulated, which means that their operation is not sensitive to the beliefs, desires, and such of the(More)
How things look (or sound, taste, smell, etc.) plays two important roles in the epistemology of perception. 1 First, our perceptual beliefs are episte-mically justified, at least in part, in virtue of how things look. Second, whether a given belief is a perceptual belief, as opposed to, say, an infer-ential belief, is also at least partly a matter of how(More)
Perceptual states represent the world as being certain ways, as having certain properties. Which ways and properties are these? When I hold out my hand and look at it, it seems that I have a visual experience of a hand. One traditional view has held that my perceptual state is not of a hand but merely of an array of color patches, or the like, which(More)
rejected. Univariate statistical tests of the observed mean differences between the teaching-and-research and research-only conditions indicated significant results for the rubric score elements " testability of hypotheses " [mean difference = 0.272, P = 0.006; CI = (.106, 0.526)] with the null hypothesis rejected in 99.3% of generated data samples (Fig. 1)(More)
Individuating cognitive processes is important epistemological work. This is most obvious in connection with the well known generality problem for reliabilism. I don't believe that solving the problem of process individuation constitutes a solution to the generality problem, although I do think it goes a substantial way toward solving that problem. I also(More)
According to a standard foundationalist theory of justification, a basic belief is one whose justification does not depend on inferential or evidential connections to other beliefs. After a bit of background introduction to the general epistemological literature, we will turn to the issues concerning basic beliefs thus construed. Are basic beliefs even(More)