Jürgen Bracht

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Charities often devise fund-raising strategies that exploit natural human competitiveness in combination with the desire for public recognition. We explore whether institutions promoting competition can affect altruistic giving-even when possibilities for public acclaim are minimal. In a controlled laboratory experiment based on a sequential " dictator game(More)
This paper examines the occurrence and fragility of information cascades in two laboratory experiments. One group of low informed participants guess sequentially which of two states has been randomly chosen. In a matched pairs design, another group of high informed participants make similar guesses after having observed the guesses of the low informed(More)
This paper reports on experiments designed to compare the performance of two incentive mechanisms in public goods problems. One mechanism rewards and p enalizes deviations from the average contribution of the other agents to the public good (tax-subsidy mechanism). Another mechanism allows agents to subsidize the other agents'contributions (compensation(More)
We experimentally test a precommitment mechanism for the trust game. Before the investor's decision , the allocator places an amount into escrow, to be forfeited if he keeps the proceeds of investment for himself. We vary the available escrow amounts—in particular, whether there is a high amount that gives rise to an efficient equilibrium—and whether escrow(More)
We study a situation where two players first choose a sharing rule, then invest into a joint production process, and then split joint benefits. We investigate how social preferences determine investments. In our experiment we find that even the materially disadvantaged player cares more for social welfare than about inequality. Behavioral preferences of(More)
We analyse pricing, e¤ort and tipping decisions at the online service "Google Answers". Users set a price for the answer to their question ex ante, and they can additionally tip the researcher who provided the answer ex post. A positive wage-e¤ort relationship is frequently found in laboratory gift-exchange games, yet …eld evidence for reciprocity in(More)
This paper examines the occurrence and fragility of information cascades in laboratory experiments. One group of low informed subjects make predictions in sequence. In a matched pairs design, another set of high informed subjects observe the decisions of the first group and make predictions. According to the theory of information cascades (Bikhchandani,(More)
We use a human–subjects experiment to test the effects of non–coercive " information " mechanisms designed to increase cooperation and efficiency in the trust game. In the equilibrium of the standard trust game, the investor does not invest, foreseeing that the allocator would have kept all of the returns from investment. Our mechanisms add a pre–play stage(More)
The Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO) is a leading research centre, combining expertise in economics, geography and law. Our objective is to study the intersection between the public and private sectors of the economy, and in particular to understand the right way to organise and deliver public services. The Centre aims to develop research,(More)
Consumer prices in many markets are persistently dispersed both across retail outlets and over time. While the cross sectional distribution of prices is stable, individual stores change their position in the distribution over time. It is a challenge to model oligopolistic price adjustment to capture these features of consumer markets. In belief based models(More)