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ing from integer-programming problems, it is optimal for the principal to order the signals according to their relative informativeness (likelihood ratio). Put differently, the agent receives the bonus for all signals that are more indicative of high effort than a cutoff signal, e.g., a salesperson receiving a bonus for meeting or exceeding the annual sales(More)
BACKGROUND Patients with LIS1-associated classic lissencephaly typically present with severe psychomotor retardation and drug-resistant epilepsy within the first year. AIM To analyze the epileptogenic phenotype and response to antiepileptic therapy in LIS1-associated classic lissencephaly. METHOD Retrospective evaluation of 22 patients (8 months-24(More)
This paper investigates the role of variance analysis procedures in aligning objectives under the condition of distorted performance measurement. A riskneutral agency with linear contracts is analyzed, whereby the agent receives postcontract, pre-decision information on his productivity. If the performance measure is informative with respect to the agent’s(More)
Tournaments have been objected as resulting from ad hoc restrictions to the contracting problem which are not easily justified. Taking into account that a performance measure might not be verifiable to a third party, however, a restriction to payments which sum up to a constant may be reasonable. The paper analyzes such fixed payment schemes with regard to(More)
The cost minimization problem in an agency model with imperfect monitoring is considered. Under the ®rst order approach, this can be stated as a convex minimization problem with linear inequality and equality constraints in a generally in®nite dimensional function space. We apply the Fenchel Duality Theorem, and obtain as a dual problem a concave(More)
The problem of designing tournament contracts under limited liability and alternative performance measures is considered. Under risk neutrality, only the best performing agent receives an extra premium if the liability constraint becomes binding. Under risk aversion, more than one prize is awarded. In both situations, performance measures can be ranked if(More)
We analyze a two-period agency problem with limited liability and nonverifiable information. The principal commits to a dynamic bonus pool comprising a fixed total payment that may be distributed over time to the agent and a third party. We find that the optimal two-period contract features memory. If the agent succeeds in the first-period, second-period(More)