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In this paper we construct a chosen-key distinguisher and a related-key attack on the full 256-bit key AES. We define a notion of differential q-multicollision and show that for AES-256 q-multicollisions can be constructed in time q · 2 67 and with negligible memory, while we prove that the same task for an ideal cipher of the same block size would require(More)
In this paper we present known-plaintext single-key and chosen-key attacks on round-reduced LED-64 and LED-128. We show that with an application of the recently proposed slidex attacks [7], one immediately improves the complexity of the previous single-key 4-step attack on LED-128. Further, we explore the possibility of multicollisions and show single-key(More)
While differential behavior of modern ciphers in a single secret key scenario is relatively well understood, and simple techniques for computation of security lower bounds are readily available, the security of modern block ciphers against related-key attacks is still very ad hoc. In this paper we make a first step towards provable security of block ciphers(More)
In this work, we apply the rebound attack to the AES based SHA-3 candidate Lane. The hash function Lane uses a permutation based compression function, consisting of a linear message expansion and 6 parallel lanes. In the rebound attack on Lane, we apply several new techniques to construct a collision for the full compression function of Lane-256 and(More)
We propose the TWEAKEY framework with goal to unify the design of tweakable block ciphers and of block ciphers resistant to related-key attacks. Our framework is simple, extends the key-alternating construction, and allows to build a primitive with arbitrary tweak and key sizes, given the public round permutation (for instance, the AES round). Increasing(More)
We describe a new tool for the search of collisions for hash functions. The tool is applicable when an attack is based on a differential trail, whose probability determines the complexity of the attack. Using the linear algebra methods we show how to organize the search so that many (in some cases — all) trail conditions are always satisfied thus(More)
In this article, we provide the first third-party security analysis of the PRINCE lightweight block cipher, and the underlying PRINCEcore. First, while no claim was made by the authors regarding related-key attacks, we show that one can attack the full cipher with only a single pair of related keys, and then reuse the same idea to derive an attack in the(More)