Majority Is Not Enough: Bitcoin Mining Is Vulnerable
The Bitcoin cryptocurrency records its transactions in a public log called the blockchain, and conventional wisdom asserts that the mining protocol is incentive-compatible and secure against colluding minority groups.
Bitcoin-NG: A Scalable Blockchain Protocol
- Ittay Eyal, Adem Efe Gencer, E. Sirer, R. V. Renesse
- Computer Science, MathematicsSymposium on Networked Systems Design and…
- 7 October 2015
This paper implements Bitcoin-NG, a new blockchain protocol designed to scale, which is Byzantine fault tolerant, is robust to extreme churn, and shares the same trust model obviating qualitative changes to the ecosystem.
The Miner's Dilemma
- Ittay Eyal
- Computer Science, EconomicsIEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
- 25 November 2014
This work defines and analyzes a game where pools use some of their participants to infiltrate other pools and perform such an attack, and studies the special cases where either two pools or any number of identical pools play the game and the rest of the participants are uninvolved.
Majority is not enough
This work shows that the Bitcoin mining protocol is not incentive-compatible, and proposes a practical modification to the Bitcoin protocol that protects Bitcoin in the general case, and prohibits selfish mining by a coalition that command less than 1/4 of the resources.
On Scaling Decentralized Blockchains - (A Position Paper)
- Kyle Croman, Christian Decker, Roger Wattenhofer
- Computer ScienceFinancial Cryptography Workshops
- 22 February 2016
The results suggest that reparameterization of block size and intervals should be viewed only as a first increment toward achieving next-generation, high-load blockchain protocols, and major advances will additionally require a basic rethinking of technical approaches.
REM: Resource-Efficient Mining for Blockchains
- Fan Zhang, Ittay Eyal, Robert Escriva, A. Juels, R. V. Renesse
- Computer Science, MathematicsIACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
- 16 August 2017
REM (Resource-Efficient Mining), a new blockchain mining framework that uses trusted hardware (Intel SGX), achieves security guarantees similar to PoW, but leverages the partially decentralized trust model inherent in SGX to achieve a fraction of the waste of PoW.
Decentralization in Bitcoin and Ethereum Networks
- Adem Efe Gencer, S. Basu, Ittay Eyal, R. V. Renesse, E. Sirer
- Computer Science, MathematicsFinancial Cryptography
- 11 January 2018
The extent of decentralization is investigated by measuring the network resources of nodes and the interconnection among them, the protocol requirements affecting the operation of nodes, and the robustness of the two systems against attacks.
Teechain: a secure payment network with asynchronous blockchain access
- Joshua Lind, O. Naor, Ittay Eyal, Florian Kelbert, E. Sirer, P. Pietzuch
- Computer Science, MathematicsSymposium on Operating Systems Principles
- 18 July 2017
Teechain is presented, the first layer-two payment network that executes off-chain transactions asynchronously with respect to the underlying blockchain, and achieves at least a 33X higher transaction throughput than the state-of-the-art Lightning payment network.
Design Choices for Central Bank Digital Currency: Policy and Technical Considerations
This paper enumerates the fundamental technical design challenges facing CBDC designers, with a particular focus on performance, privacy, and security, and presents a vision of the rich range of functionalities and use cases that a well-designed CBDC platform could ultimately offer users.
The Gap Game
- Itay Tsabary, Ittay Eyal
- Computer Science, EconomicsAnnual Haifa Experimental Systems Conference
- 14 May 2018
This work analyzes cryptocurrency security in realistic settings, taking into account all elements of expenses and rewards, and shows that gaps form well before fees are the only incentive, and analyzes the implications on security.