Isabella Mastroeni

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In this paper we generalize the notion of non-interference making it parametric relatively to what an attacker can analyze about the input/output information flow. The idea is to consider attackers as data-flow analyzers, whose task is to reveal properties of confidential resources by analyzing public ones. This means that no unauthorized flow of(More)
We discuss the relation between program slicing and data dependencies. We claim that slicing can be defined, and therefore calculated, parametrically on the chosen notion of dependency, which implies a different result when building the program dependency graph. In this framework, it is possible to choose dependency in the syntactic or semantic sense, thus(More)
domain completeness Let < A, α, γ, C > a Galois insertion. [Cousot & Cousot ’77,’79] f : C −→ C, f = α ◦ f ◦ γ : A −→ A (b.c.a. of f) and ρ=γ ◦ α α(x) x f αf(x) =fα(x) ⊥ ⊥ a > > a ρ correct for f f α f(x) αf(x) Adjoining Declassification and Attack Models by Abstract Interpretation – p.5/19 Abstract domain completeness Let < A, α, γ, C > a Galois insertion.(More)
In this paper we introduce a compositional proof-system for certifying abstract non-interference in programming languages. Certifying abstract noninterference means proving that no unauthorized flow of information is observable by the attacker from confidential to public data. The properties of the computation that an attacker may observe are specified as(More)
Domain Completeness Isabella Mastroeni and Anindya Banerjee a Università di Verona, Verona, Italy e-mail:isabella.mastroeni@univr.it b IMDEA Software Institute, Madrid, Spain e-mail: anindya.banerjee@imdea.org Received 13 October 2010 This paper explores a three dimensional characterization of a declassification-based noninterference policy and its(More)
Program Slicing: From Theory towards an Implementation Isabella Mastroeni and Ðurica Nikolić Dipartimento di Informatica, Università di Verona, Italy isabella.mastroeni@gmail.com, durica.nikolic@univr.it Abstract. In this paper we extend the formal framework proposed by Binkley et al. for representing and comparing forms of program slicing. This framework(More)
In this paper we describe two uses of Boolean functions in the context of secure information flow analysis. The first contribution concerns with modeling information flow with Boolean functions, which leads to an accurate information flow analysis that captures dependencies between possible flows. These dependencies are useful for debugging; refining the(More)