Isabel Schnabel

Learn More
Latent inhibition (LI) is a behavioral paradigm in which repeated exposure to stimuli not followed by meaningful consequences renders these stimuli ineffective for subsequent learning. The development of LI is considered to reflect learning not to attend to, ignore, or tune out irrelevant stimuli. The present study investigated the differences in the(More)
We consider a banking model in which firms’ access to credit is constrained due to the banks’ limited risk-bearing capacities. We show that such constraints may be relaxed by allowing banks to transfer risks to outside investors. However, the market for credit risk transfer (CRT) works smoothly only if loans are based on hard, i. e., verifiable information.(More)
The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily refl ect those of the editors. Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der deutschen National-bibliografi e; detaillierte(More)
The explicit or implicit protection of banks through government bail-out policies is a universal phenomenon. We analyze the competitive effects of such policies in two models with different degrees of transparency in the banking sector. Our main result is that the bail-out policy unambiguously leads to higher risk-taking at those banks that do not enjoy a(More)
Using industry-level data, this paper shows that the European transition region benefited much more strongly from financial integration in terms of economic growth than other developing countries in the years preceding the current crisis. We analyse several factors that may explain this finding: financial development, institutional quality, trade(More)
This paper shows that bonus contracts may arise endogenously as a response to agency problems within banks, and analyzes how compensation schemes change in reaction to anticipated bail-outs. If there is a risk-shifting problem, bail-out expectations lead to steeper bonus schemes and even more risk-taking. If there is an effort problem, the compensation(More)
This paper yields a rationale for why subsidized public banks may be desirable from a regional perspective in a financially integrated economy. We present a model with credit rationing and heterogeneous regions in which public banks prevent a capital drain from poorer to richer regions by subsidizing local depositors, for example, through a public(More)
We present a banking model with imperfect competition in which borrowers’ access to credit is improved when banks are able to transfer credit risks. However, the market for credit risk transfer (CRT) works smoothly only if the quality of loans is public information. If the quality of loans is private information, banks have an incentive to grant(More)
We construct a unique dataset of legislative reforms in merger control legislation that occurred in nineteen industrial countries in the period 1987-2004, and investigate the economic impact of these changes on stock prices. In line with the hypothesis that merger control should challenge anticompetitive mergers and thus limit future monopolistic profits,(More)