Irina Suleymanova

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We examine a technology adoption game with network e¤ects in which coordination on technology A and technology B constitute a Nash equilibrium. Coordination on technology B is assumed to be payo¤-dominant. We de…ne a technology’s critical mass as the minimum share of users necessary to make the choice of this technology a best response for any remaining(More)
We develop a dynamic model of strategic investment in a transnational pipeline system. In the absence of international contract enforcement, countries may distort investment in order to increase their bargaining power, resulting in overinvestment in expensive and underinvestment in cheap pipelines. With repeated interaction, however, there is a potential to(More)
We propose a duopoly model of competition between internet search engines endowed with di¤erent technologies and study the e¤ects of an agreement where the more advanced …rm shares its technology with the inferior one. We show that the superior …rm enters the agreement only if it results in a large enough increase in demand for advertising space at the(More)
We analyze Bertrand duopoly competition in markets with network e¤ects and consumer switching costs. Depending on the ratio of switching costs to network e¤ects, our model generates four di¤erent market patterns: monopolization and market sharing which can be either monotone or alternating. A critical mass e¤ect, where one …rm becomes the monopolist for(More)
We analyze duopoly Bertrand competition under network e¤ects. We consider both incompatible and compatible products. Our main result is that network e¤ects create a fundamental con‡ict between the maximization of social welfare and consumer surplus whenever products are incompatible. While consumer surplus is highest in the symmetric equilibrium, social(More)
We analyze the role of consumer expectations in a Hotelling model of price competition when products exhibit network e¤ects. Expectations can be strong (stubborn), weak (pricesensitive) or partially stubborn (a mix of weak and strong). As a rule, the price-sensitivity of demand declines when expectations are more stubborn. An increase of stubbornness i)(More)
We analyze the choices between two technologies A and B that both exhibit network e¤ects. We introduce a critical mass game in which coordination on either one of the standards constitutes a Nash equilibrium outcome while coordination on standard B is assumed to be payo¤-dominant. We present a heuristic de…nition of a critical mass and show that the(More)
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