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If an off-the-shelf software product exhibits poor dependability due to design faults, then software fault tolerance is often the only way available to users and system integrators to alleviate the problem. Thanks to low acquisition costs, even using multiple versions of software in a parallel architecture, which is a scheme formerly reserved for few and(More)
Assessment of software COTS components is an essential part of component-based software development. Sub-optimal selection of components may lead to solutions with low quality. The assessment is based on incomplete knowledge about the COTS components themselves and other aspects, which may affect the choice such as the vendor's credentials, etc. We argue in(More)
One of the key benefits of using intrusion-tolerant systems is the possibility of ensuring correct behavior in the presence of attacks and intrusions. These security gains are directly dependent on the components exhibiting failure diversity. To what extent failure diversity is observed in practical deployment depends on how diverse are the components that(More)
Fault tolerance in the form of diverse redundancy is well known to improve the detection rates for both malicious and non-malicious failures. What is of interest to designers of security protection systems are the actual gains in detection rates that they may give. In this paper we provide exploratory analysis of the potential gains in detection capability(More)
• Topics: – automatic recovery and response techniques – use of Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithms in IT – diversity and failure independence • " The workshop will be especially interested in 'practical intrusion-tolerant systems' " • " How to build information systems that are inherently resilient to intrusions " • " Papers can present ongoing work and/or(More)
SUMMARY One of the key benefits of using intrusion-tolerant systems is the possibility of ensuring correct behavior in the presence of attacks and intrusions. These security gains are directly dependent on the components exhibiting failure diversity. To what extent failure diversity is observed in practical deployment depends on how diverse are the(More)
We have previously reported [1] the results of an exploratory analysis of the potential gains in detection capability from using diverse AntiVirus products. The analysis was based on 1599 malware samples collected from a distributed honey pot deployment over a period of 178 days. The malware samples were sent to the signature engines of 32 different(More)
In this paper we present empirical results and speculative analysis based on observations collected over a two month period from studies with two high interaction honeynets, deployed in a corporate and an SME (small to medium enterprise) environment, and a distributed honeypots deployment. All three networks contain a mixture of Windows and Linux hosts. We(More)