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The method of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS), in its current form, is confronted with a difficulty when it tries to explain how some social behaviors initiate their evolution. We show that this difficulty may be removed by changing the assumption made tacitly in game theory (and in ESS) of randomness of meetings or encounters. In reality, such(More)
We propose a mathematical model to analyze the evolution of canalization for a trait under stabilizing selection, where each individual in the population is randomly exposed to different environmental conditions, independently of its genotype. Without canalization, our trait (primary phenotype) is affected by both genetic variation and environmental(More)
Eighteen different terms, currently employed to define various concepts of evolutionary stability in population dynamics are mentioned in this paper. Most of these terms are used in different connotations and even different meanings by different authors. On the other hand, different terms are often employed by different authors to define quite the same(More)
In 1973, Maynard Smith and Price introduced game theory to the study of intraspecific conflicts. The resulting marriage has proved very fruitful of biological models (see Krebs and Davies (1978) for examples). Even simple, biologically intuitive games with a small number of strategies yield evolutionary stable equilibria with an unexpectedly rich mixture of(More)
A stochastic process of long-term evolution due to mutation and selection is defined over an asexually reproducing population, with selection according to a population game with a one-dimensional continuity of pure strategies. Limiting the analysis to mutations of small effect, it is shown that long-term dynamic stability in such a process is equivalent to(More)