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The first measurement of the charged-particle multiplicity density at midrapidity in Pb-Pb collisions at a center-of-mass energy per nucleon pair √ S NN = 2.76 TeV is presented. For an event sample corresponding to the most central 5% of the hadronic cross section, the pseudorapidity density of primary charged particles at midrapidity is 1584 ± 4(stat) ±(More)
The measurement of primary π ± , K ± , p and p production at mid-rapidity (|y| < 0.5) in proton–proton collisions at √ s = 7 TeV performed with a large ion collider experiment at the large hadron collider (LHC) is reported. Particle identification is performed using the specific ioni-sation energy-loss and time-of-flight information, the ring-imaging(More)
We report the first measurement of charged particle elliptic flow in Pb-Pb collisions at sqrt[S(NN)] =2.76 TeV with the ALICE detector at the CERN Large Hadron Collider. The measurement is performed in the central pseudorapidity region (|η|<0.8) and transverse momentum range 0.2<p t<5.0 GeV/c. The elliptic flow signal v₂, measured using the 4-particle(More)
This paper studies the effects of tariffs on intra-firm trade. Building on the Antràs and Helpman (2004) North-South theoretical framework, I show that higher Northern tariffs reduce the incentives for outsourcing and offshoring, while higher Southern tariffs have the opposite effects. I also show that increased offshoring and outsourcing imply an increase(More)
We separate the budgetary and non-budgetary effects of price on demand using choice data from wine tasting experiments in which consumers tasted wines of different quality accompanied by fictitious price information. The non-budgetary effect is present and nonlinear: it is strongly positive between e 3 and e 5, and undetectable between e 5 and e 8. We find(More)
In this paper, I study dynamic common-value contests. Agents arrive over time and expend efforts to compete for prizes that are allocated proportionally according to efforts exerted. This model can be applied to a number of examples, including rent-seeking, lobbying, advertising, and R&D competitions. I provide a full characterization of equilibria in(More)
We propose a simple mechanism that sustains full cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. Players sequentially decide whether to contribute to a public good. They do not know their position in the sequence, but observe the actions of some predecessors. Position uncertainty provides an incentive to contribute(More)
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