Igal Milchtaich

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Different kinds of networks, such as transportation, communication, computer, and supply networks, are susceptible to similar kinds of inefficiencies. These arise when congestion externalities make each user’s cost depend on the other users’ choices of routes. If each user chooses the least expensive (e.g., fastest) route from the users’ common point of(More)
Equilibrium ‡ow in a physical network with a large number of users (e.g., transportation, communication and computer networks) need not be unique if the costs of the network elements are not the same for all users. Such di¤erences among users may arise if they are not equally a¤ected by congestion or have di¤erent intrinsic preferences. Whether or not, for(More)
We consider a special case of weighted congestion games with playerspecific latency functions where each player uses for each particular resource a fixed (non-decreasing) delay function together with a player-specific constant. For each particular resource, the resource-specific delay function and the playerspecific constant (for that resource) are composed(More)
A crowding game is a noncooperative game in which the payo¤ of each player depends only on the player’s action and the size of the set of players choosing that particular action: The larger the set, the smaller the payo¤. Finite, n-player crowding games often have multiple equilibria. However, a large crowding game generically has just one equilibrium, and(More)
A sequential-move version of a given normal-form game Γ is an extensive-form game of perfect information in which each player chooses his action after observing the actions of all players who precede him and the payoffs are determined according to the payoff functions in Γ. A normal-form game Γ is sequentially solvable if each of its sequential-move(More)
Players in a congestion game may differ from one another in their intrinsic preferences (e.g., the benefit they get from using a specific resource), their contribution to congestion, or both. In many cases of interest, intrinsic preferences and the negative effect of congestion are (additively or multiplicatively) separable. This paper considers the(More)