Igal Kvart

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David Lewis’s counterfactual analysis of cause consisted of the counterfactual conditional closed under transitivity.2 Namely, a sufficient condition for A’s being a cause of C is that ∼A>∼C be true; and a necessary as well as sufficient condition is that there be a series of true counterfactuals ∼A>∼E1, ∼E1 >∼E2, . . . , ∼En >∼C (n> 0). At the core of this(More)
In his ‘Causation as Influence’, David Lewis proposed a counterfactual theory of cause which was designed to improve on his previous account. Here I offer counter-examples to this new account, involving early preemption and late preemption, and a revised account, which is no longer an influence theory, that handles those counter-examples. Lewis’s new(More)
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