Ichiro Obara

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We analyze in...nitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma games with imperfect private monitoring, and construct sequential equilibria where strategies are measurable with respect to players’ beliefs regarding their opponents’ continuation strategies. We show that, when monitoring is almost perfect, the symmetric e¢cient outcome can be approximated in any(More)
Most theoretical or applied research on repeated games with imperfect monitoring has restricted attention to public strategies ; strategies that only depend on history of publicly observable signals, and perfect public equilibria (PPE); sequential equilibria in public strategies. The present paper sheds light on the role of private strategies ; strategies(More)
We present three examples of finitely repeated games with public monitoring that have sequential equilibria in private strategies, i.e., strategies that depend on own past actions as well as public signals. Such private sequential equilibria can have features quite unlike those of the more familiar perfect public equilibria: (i) making a public signal less(More)
In the U.S., local governments regulate private land use mainly through zoning. By creating a barrier to entry and lessening competition in local business markets, their regulation has the potential to generate a distortion. This paper assesses the empirical relevance of this hypothesis using microdata on midscale Texas chain hotels and land use regulation(More)
I consider a situation in which a principal commits to a mechanism first and then agents choose unobservable actions before they draw their types. The agents’ actions affect not only their payoffs directly but also a distribution of private types as well. Thus, the distribution of types is determined endogenously rather than exogeneously unlike standard(More)
In this note, we study an another information structure, imperfect public monitoring. In this class of model, players cannot observe the other players’ actions directly, but can observe imperfect and public signals about them. There are at least two reasons why this information structure is worth special attention. First, it is simply a more reasonable(More)
This paper proves a new folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring and communication, extending the idea of delayed communication in Compte [6] to the case where private signals are correlated. The sufficient condition for the folk theorem is generically satisfied with more than two players, even when other well-known conditions are not. The(More)
Since Bernard de Mandeville (1924[1705]) andAdam Smith (1937[1776]), students of social life have stressed that cooperation occurs when it is in the personal interest of self-interested individuals to contribute to the collective good. We call this mutualistic cooperation. Mutualistic cooperation results from social rules that make prosocial behavior(More)
We describe the maximum efficient subgame perfect equilibrium payoff for a player in the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, as a function of the discount factor. For discount factors above a critical level, every efficient, feasible, individually rational payoff profile can be sustained. For an open and dense subset of discount factors below the critical value,(More)