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Bayesian consumers infer that hidden add-on prices (e.g., the cost of ink for a printer) are likely to be high prices. If consumers are Bayesian, firms will not shroud information in equilibrium. However, shrouding may occur in an economy with some myopic (or unaware) consumers. Such shrouding creates an inefficiency , which firms may have an incentive to(More)
In recent auctions for paging licenses, the Federal Communications Commission has granted businesses owned by minorities and women substantial bidding credits. In this article, Professors Ayres and Cramton analyze a particular auction and argue that the affirmative action bidding preferences, by increasing competition among auction participants, increased(More)
This paper analyzes six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from July 1994 to May 1996. These auctions were simultaneous multiple-round auctions in which collections of licenses were auctioned simultaneously. This auction form proved remarkably successful. Similar items sold for similar prices and bidders successfully(More)
By providing feedback to customers on home electricity and natural gas usage with a focus on peer comparisons, utilities can reduce energy consumption at a low cost. We analyze data from two large-scale, random-assignment field experiments conducted by utility companies providing electricity (the Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD)) and electricity(More)
This paper offers an economic analysis of color-blind alternatives to conventional affirmative action policies in higher education, focusing on efficiency issues. When the distribution of applicants' traits is fixed (i.e., in the short run) color-blindness leads colleges to shift weight from academic traits that predict performance to social traits that(More)
Randomized natural experiments provide social scientists with rare opportunities to draw credible causal inferences in real world settings. We capitalize on such a unique experiment to examine how the name order of candidates on ballots affects election outcomes. Since 1975 California has randomized the ballot order for statewide offices with a complex(More)
The standard contract that governs friendly mergers contains a material adverse change clause (a " MAC ") and a material adverse effect clause (a " MAE "); these clauses permit a buyer costlessly to cancel the deal if such a change or effect occurs. In recent years, the traditional MAC and MAE term has been supplemented by a detailed set of exceptions that(More)