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The least square values and the shapley value for cooperative TU games
The main result proved in this paper is the fact that any Least Square Value is the Shapley value of a game obtained from the given game by rescaling. An Average per capita formula for Least SquareExpand
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A note on minimizing the weighted sum of tardy and early completion penalties in a single machine: A case of small common due date
This paper studies the problem of scheduling a set of n jobs on a single machine to minimize weighted absolute deviation of completion times from a common due date. It is assumed that weights of jobsExpand
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A procedure for finding the nucleolus of a cooperativen person game
  • I. Dragan
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Z. Oper. Research
  • 1 August 1981
The nucleolus is a central concept of solution in the theory of cooperativen person games with side payments; it has been introduced and studied by Schmeidler [1969] and several methods for finding it have been proposed by Kopelowitz and Bruyneel. Expand
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Superadditivity for solutions of coalitional games
Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research You may not further distribute the material or use it for anyExpand
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Multiweighted Shapley Values and Random Order Values
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In this paper, we solve the inverse problem for the class of Values of Cooperative TU games, called the Multiweighted Shapley Values, introduced in an earlier work of the author (see (2)): find outExpand
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On the Semivalues and the Least Square Values Average Per Capita Formulas and Relationships
In this paper, it is shown that both the Semivalues and the Least Square Values of cooperative transferable utilities games can be expressed in terms of n2 averages of values of the characteristicExpand
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On The Inverse Problem for Semivalues of Cooperative TU Games
The Semivalues were introduced axiomatically by Dubey et al [7], as weighted values of cooperative games. For transferable utility games (TU games), they obtained a formula for computing theExpand
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On the Computation of Semivalues for TU Games
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Collinearity between the Shapley value and the egalitarian division rules for cooperative games
For each cooperativen-person gamev and eachh∈{1, 2, ⋯,n}, letvh be the average worth of coalitions of sizeh andvhi the average worth of coalitions of sizeh which do not contain playeri∈N. The paperExpand
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