• Publications
  • Influence
Snow White: Provably Secure Proofs of Stake
TLDR
In this work, we provide the first consensus candidate that provably satisfies the desired robustness properties for proofs-of-stake. Expand
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Proof of Activity: Extending Bitcoin's Proof of Work via Proof of Stake [Extended Abstract]y
TLDR
We propose a new protocol for a cryptocurrency, that builds upon the Bitcoin protocol by combining its Proof of Work component with a Proof of Stake type of system. Expand
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Cryptocurrencies Without Proof of Work
TLDR
We study decentralized cryptocurrency protocols in which the participants do not deplete physical scarce resources, and argue that they help in mitigating problems that the existing protocols exhibit. Expand
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How to Use Bitcoin to Design Fair Protocols
TLDR
We study a model of fairness in secure computation in which an adversarial party that aborts on receiving output is forced to pay a mutually predefined monetary penalty. Expand
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Sprites and State Channels: Payment Networks that Go Faster Than Lightning
TLDR
We propose a novel variant of payment channels, called Sprites, that reduces the worst-case "collateral cost" that each hop along the route may incur. Expand
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Scalable, transparent, and post-quantum secure computational integrity
TLDR
We report the first realization of a transparent ZK system (ZK-STARK) in which verification scales exponentially faster than database size, and moreover, this exponential speedup in verification is observed concretely for meaningful and sequential computations. Expand
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Sprites: Payment Channels that Go Faster than Lightning
TLDR
We develop a novel construction for payment channels that reduces the worst-case “collateral cost” for offchain payments. Expand
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Pisa: Arbitration Outsourcing for State Channels
TLDR
We present Pisa, the first protocol to propose an accountable third party who can be hired by parties to cancel execution forks on their behalf. Expand
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How to Use Bitcoin to Incentivize Correct Computations
TLDR
We study a model of incentivizing correct computations in a variety of cryptographic tasks, namely verifiable computation, secure computation, fair computation, and bounty mechanisms. Expand
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How to Use Bitcoin to Play Decentralized Poker
TLDR
We formalize, generalize, and construct multiparty protocols for the primitive suggested by Andrychowicz et al. to perform secure multiparty computations on Bitcoin. Expand
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