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We present the design and implementation of RICH (Run-time Integer CHecking), a tool for efficiently detecting integer-based attacks against C programs at run time. C integer bugs, a popular avenue of attack and frequent programming error [1–15], occur when a variable value goes out of the range of the machine word used to materialize it, e.g. when… (More)

We show the existence of concurrent non-malleable commitments based on the existence of one-way functions. Our proof of security only requires the use of black-box techniques, and additionally provides an arguably simplified proof of the existence of even stand-alone secure non-malleable commitments.

We present a unified framework for obtaining Universally Composable (UC) protocols by relying on stand-alone secure non-malleable commitments. Essentially all results on concurrent secure computation--both in relaxed models (e.g., quasi-polynomial time simulation), or with trusted set-up assumptions (e.g., the CRS model, the imperfect CRS model, or the… (More)

We show a technique for amplifying commitment schemes that are non-malleable with respect to identities of length t, into ones that are non-malleable with respect to identities of length Ω(2<sup>t</sup>), while only incurring a constant overhead in round-complexity. As a result we obtain a construction of O(1)<sup>log* n</sup>-round (i.e.,… (More)

We construct a general-purpose indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) scheme for all polynomial-size circuits from constant-degree graded encoding schemes in the plain model, assuming the existence of a subexponentially secure Pseudo-Random Generator (PRG) computable by constant-degree arithmetic circuits (or equivalently in NC 0), and the subexponential… (More)

- Sundar Vishwanathan, Thomas Rothvoß, László A. Végh, Sanjam Garg, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi +37 others
- 2014

We present a designated verifier CS proof system for polynomial time computations. The proof system can only be verified by a designated verifier: one who has published a public-key for which it knows a matching secret key unknown to the prover. Whereas Micali's CS proofs require the existence of random oracles, we can base soundness on computational… (More)

- Shai Halevi, Huijia Lin
- TCC
- 2011

What does it mean for an encryption scheme to be leakage-resilient? Prior formulations require that the scheme remains semantically secure even in the presence of leakage, but only considered leakage that occurs before the challenge ciphertext is generated. Although seemingly necessary, this restriction severely limits the usefulness of the resulting… (More)

We construct the first general secure computation protocols that require no trusted infrastructure other than authenticated communication, and that satisfy a meaningful notion of security that is preserved under universal composition—assuming only the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations. The notion of security fits within a generalization of the "… (More)

This paper studies the question of how to define, construct, and use obfuscators for probabilistic programs. Such obfuscators compile a possibly randomized program into a deterministic one, which achieves computationally indistinguishable behavior from the original program as long as it is run on each input at most once. For obfuscation, we propose a notion… (More)