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- Michal Feldman, Hui Fu, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
- STOC
- 2013

Simultaneous item auctions are simple and practical procedures for allocating items to bidders with potentially complex preferences. In a simultaneous auction, every bidder submits independent bidsâ€¦ (More)

- Shahar Dobzinski, Hui Fu, Robert D. Kleinberg
- STOC
- 2011

We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there exists an algorithmâ€¦ (More)

We study an abstract optimal auction problem for selecting a subset of self-interested agents to whom to provide a service. A feasibility constraint governs which subsets can be simultaneouslyâ€¦ (More)

- Doug Mccarty, Hui Fu, Paul E Monahan, Charles E Toulson, Pradeep Naik, Richard Jude Samulski
- Gene Therapy
- 2003

An important limitation of recombinant adeno-associated virus (rAAV) vector efficiency is the requirement of hostcell-mediated synthesis of double-stranded DNA from the single-stranded genome. Weâ€¦ (More)

Motivated by the problem of querying and communicating biddersâ€™ valuations in combinatorial auctions, we study how well different classes of set functions can be sketched. More formally, let f be aâ€¦ (More)

- Hui Fu, Robert D. Kleinberg, Ron Lavi
- EC
- 2012

A Walrasian equilibrium in an economy with non-identical indivisible items exists only for small classes of players' valuations (mostly "gross substitutes" valuations), and may not generally existâ€¦ (More)

- Shuchi Chawla, Hui Fu, Anna R. Karlin
- EC
- 2014

We study revenue maximization in settings where agents' values are interdependent: each agent receives a signal drawn from a correlated distribution and agents' values are functions of all of theâ€¦ (More)

- Saeed Alaei, Hui Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Azarakhsh Malekian
- 2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations ofâ€¦
- 2013

The intuition that profit is optimized by maximizing marginal revenue is a guiding principle in microeconomics. In the classical auction theory for agents with quasi-linear utility andâ€¦ (More)

CrÃ©mer and McLean [1985] showed that, when buyers' valuations are drawn from a correlated distribution, an auction with full knowledge on the distribution can extract the full social surplus. Weâ€¦ (More)

- David Buchfuhrer, Shaddin Dughmi, +6 authors Christopher Umans
- SODA
- 2010

The existence of incentive-compatible, computationally-efficient mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with good approximation ratios is the paradigmatic problem in algorithmic mechanism design. Itâ€¦ (More)