Consider a committee which must select one alternative from a set of three or more alternatives. Committee members each cast a ballot which the voting procedure counts. The voting procedure isâ€¦ (More)

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions ofâ€¦ (More)

Subgame-perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period. Assume zero costs, positive interest rate, continuum of buyers, and some technicalâ€¦ (More)

Consider a Bayesian collective decision problem in which the preferences of agents are private information. We provide a general demonstration that the utility costs associated with incentiveâ€¦ (More)

Consider an arbitrary Bayesian decision problem in which the preferences of each agent are private information. We prove that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints typicallyâ€¦ (More)

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, inâ€¦ (More)

Over the past fifty years we have learned that the possibility of efficient social interaction depends not only on resources and technology, but equally and most critically on incentive constraints,â€¦ (More)

For groups that must make several decisions of similar form, we define a simple and general mechanism that is designed to promote social efficiency. The mechanism links the various decisions byâ€¦ (More)

Consider an arbitrary Bayesian decision problem in which the preferences of each agent are private information. We prove that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints typicallyâ€¦ (More)