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Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
TLDR
We study the efficiency of Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) outcomes of simultaneous first- and second-price auctions when bidders have complement-free (a.k.a. subadditive) valuations. Expand
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Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction
TLDR
We study an abstract optimal auction problem for selecting a subset of self-interested agents to whom to provide a service. Expand
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Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy
TLDR
We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We show that in the oracle model introduced by Ronen and Saberi [FOCS'02], there exists a polynomial time truthful in expectation mechanism that provides a (1.5+ε)-approximation to the revenue achievable by an optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism. Expand
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Randomization Beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent Auction
TLDR
This paper gives the first mechanism that outperforms the second price auction in Bulow and Klemperer's setting. Expand
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Approximate revenue maximization in interdependent value settings
TLDR
We study revenue maximization in settings where agents' values are interdependent: each agent receives a signal drawn from a correlated distribution and agents’ values are functions of all of the signals. Expand
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Sketching valuation functions
TLDR
We show that for every subadditive function f there exists an α-sketch where α = n1/2. Expand
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The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions
TLDR
This paper considers mechanism design in environments where the agents have multi-dimensional and non-linear preferences. Expand
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Conditional equilibrium outcomes via ascending price processes with applications to combinatorial auctions with item bidding
TLDR
A Walrasian equilibrium in an economy with non-identical indivisible items exists only for small classes of players' valuations, and may not generally exist even with decreasing marginal values. Expand
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Physcomitrella patens arabinogalactan proteins contain abundant terminal 3-O-methyl-l-rhamnosyl residues not found in angiosperms
A biochemical investigation of arabinogalactan proteins (AGPs) in Physcomitrellapatens was undertaken with particular emphasis on the glycan chains. Following homogenization and differentialExpand
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Optimal auctions for correlated buyers with sampling
TLDR
We study whether this phenomenon persists when the auctioneer has only incomplete knowledge of the distribution, represented by a finite family of candidate distributions, and has sample access to the real distribution. Expand
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