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The classical capacity of the lossy bosonic channel is calculated exactly. It is shown that its Holevo information is not superadditive, and that a coherent-state encoding achieves capacity. The capacity of far-field, free-space optical communications is given as an example.

Strengthening a result of Yuen-Kennedy-Lax and Holevo (YKLH), we relax the (redundant) standard conditions for optimality of minimum-error quantum measurements while retaining sufficiency. This result is made robust by giving quantitative bounds on non-optimality when the simplified conditions fail to hold. These conditions serendipitously appeared as an… (More)

We demonstrate high data-rate quantum-noise{protected data encryption through optical fibers using coherent states of light. Specifically, we demonstrate 650Mbps data encryption through a 10Gbps data-bearing, in-line amplified 200km-long line. In our protocol, legitimate users (who share a short secret-key) communicate using an M-ry signal set while an… (More)

The classical-information capacity of lossy bosonic channels is studied, with emphasis on the far-field free space channel. 1 Classical capacity A prominent landmark in the extension of Shannon information theory to the quantum domain is the realization that any particular physical system can store only a finite amount of information. As a consequence, the… (More)

A team of researchers from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Northwestern University (NU) is developing a system for long-distance, high- delity qubit tele-portation. Such a system will be required if future quantum computers are to be linked together into a quantum Internet. This paper presents recent progress that the MIT/NU team has… (More)

Lo and Ko in [1] have developed some attacks on the cryptosystem called αη [2], claiming that these attacks undermine the security of αη for both direct encryption and key generation. In this paper, we show that their arguments fail in many different ways. In particular, the first attack in [1] requires channel loss or length of known-plaintext that is… (More)