Hongyao Ma

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In this extended abstract, we consider simple coordination problems , such as allocating the right to use a shared sports facility in a way that maximizes its usage, or picking the time of a meeting in a way that maximizes attendance. More generally, an alternative is selected by a mechanism in period zero based on reports from agents. This induces a(More)
We study the problem of incentivizing reliable demand-response in modern electricity grids. Each agent is uncertain about her future ability to reduce demand and unreliable. Agents who choose to participate in a demand-response scheme may be paid when they respond and penalized otherwise. The goal is to reliably achieve a demand reduction target while(More)
We study the problem of assigning resources in order to maximize the probability of resource utilization. This is a sensible design goal in many settings with shared resources. Each agent has private information about its value distribution for different assignments. A mechanism elicits information about value distributions, using this information to(More)
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