Holger Andreas

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Whether or not meaning is compositional has been a major issue in linguistics and formal philosophy of language for the last two decades. Semantic holism is widely and plausibly considered as an objection to the principle of semantic compositionality therein. It comes as a surprise that the holistic peculiarities of scientific language have been rarely(More)
Modal logic has been applied in many different areas, as reasoning about time, knowledge and belief, necessity and possibility, to mention only some examples. In the present paper, an attempt is made to use modal logic to account for the semantics of theoretical sentences in scientific language. Theoretical sentences have been studied extensively since the(More)
In this paper, a solution to the problem of theoretical terms is developed that is based on Carnap’s doctrine of indirect interpretation of theoretical terms. This doctrine will be given a semantic, model-theoretic explanation that is not given by Carnap himself as he remains content with a syntactic explanation. From that semantic explanation, rules for(More)
In this paper, a new account of empirical claims in structuralism is developed. Its novelty derives from the use that ismadeof the linguistic approach to scientific theories despite the presumed incompatibility of structuralism with that approach. It is shown how the linguistic approach can be applied to the framework of structuralism if the semantic(More)
The present paper aims at a synthesis of belief revision theory with the Sneed formalism known as the structuralist theory of science. This synthesis is brought about by a dynamisation of classical structuralism, with an abductive inference rule and base generated revisions in the style of Rott (2001). The formalism of prioritised default logic (PDL) serves(More)
I. AGM Belief Revision Theory 1) The Elements of Epistemological Theories: Ch. 1 of [4]. 2) Models of Epistemic States: Ch. 2.1 – 2.5 of [4]. 3) Expansions, Revisions, and Contractions I: Ch. 3.1 – 3.4 of [4]. 4) Expansions, Revisions, and Contractions II: Ch. 3.5 – 3.7 of [4]. 5) Epistemic Entrenchment and Construction of Contraction Functions I: Ch. 4.1 –(More)