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Core in a simple coalition formation game
TLDR
We analyze the core of a class of coalition formation games in which every player's payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. Expand
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Coalition formation as a dynamic process
TLDR
We study coalition formation as an ongoing, dynamic process,with payoffs generated as coalitions form, disintegrate, or regroup. Expand
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Equilibria in a Model with Partial Rivalry
Abstract In this paper we show that a non-cooperative game with a finite set of players and common finite strategy sets possesses a strong Nash equilibrium in pure strategies whenever individuals'Expand
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Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Group Formation Game with Positive Externalities
Abstract This paper identifies a domain of payoff functions in no spillover noncooperative games with Positive externality which admit a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Since in general a NashExpand
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Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-intern Markets
TLDR
We analyze capacity manipulation games in hospital-intern markets inspired by the real-life entry-level labor markets for young physicians who seek residencies at hospitals. Expand
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Free Trade Networks
The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) as a network formation game. We consider a general n-country model in which countries trade differentiated industrial commodities asExpand
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On the Shapley–Scarf economy: the case of multiple types of indivisible goods
We study a generalization of Shapley-Scarf's (1974) economy in which multiple types of indivisible goods are traded. We show that many of the distinctive results from the Shapley-Scarf economy do notExpand
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Concentration of Competing Retail Stores
Geographical concentration of stores that sell similar commodities is pervasive. To analyze this phenomenon, this paper provides a simple two dimensional spatial competition model with consumer tasteExpand
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Free Trade Networks with Transfers
The paper investigates the network of bilateral free trade agreements (FTA) in the context of a network formation game with transfers. Furusawa and Konishi (2002) show that without internationalExpand
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Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
TLDR
We show that in two-sided many-to-many matching problems, pairwise stable matchings may not be immune to group deviations, unlike in many- to-one matching problems. Expand
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