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Human groups maintain a high level of sociality despite a low level of relatedness among group members. This paper reviews the evidence for an empirically identifiable form of prosocial behavior in humans, which we call "strong reciprocity", that may in part explain human sociality. A strong reciprocator is predisposed to cooperate with others and punish(More)
We propose an explanation of cooperation among unrelated members of a social group in which cooperation evolves because it constitutes an honest signal of the member's quality as a mate, coalition partner or competitor, and therefore results in advantageous alliances for those signaling in this manner. Our model is framed as a multi-player public goods game(More)
The enforcement of social norms often requires that unaffected third parties sanction offenders. Given the renewed interest of economists in norms, the literature on third-party punishment is surprisingly thin. In this paper, we report the results of an experiment designed to replicate the anger-based punishment of directly affected second parties and(More)
  • Philip Pablo Mellizo, PHILIP PABLO MELLIZO, +14 authors Mike Chavira
  • 2014
ESSAYS ON BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS SEPTEMBER 2010 PHILIP PABLO MELLIZO, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST Directed by: Professor Peter Skott and Professor Jeffrey Carpenter Overview Economists typically understand the firm as an organization comprised of a series of incomplete(More)
The stylized facts of ultimatum bargaining in the experimental lab are that o ers tend to be near an equal split of the surplus and low, near perfect, o ers are routinely rejected. Binmore et al (1995) use aspiration-based evolutionary dynamics to model the evolution of fair play in a binary choice version of this game, and show that incredible threats to(More)
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