Harrison Hong

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We model a market populated by two groups of boundedly rational agents: “newswatchers” and “momentum traders.” Each newswatcher observes some private information, but fails to extract other newswatchers’ information from prices. If information diffuses gradually across the population, prices underreact in the short run. The underreaction means that the(More)
We document the di erential pricing of individual equity options versus the market index, and relate it to variations in return skewness. The impact of risk aversion induced by marginalutility tilting of the physical density can introduce skewness in the risk-neutral density. We derive laws that decompose individual return skewness into a systematic(More)
The basic paradigm of asset pricing is in vibrant f lux. The purely rational approach is being subsumed by a broader approach based upon the psychology of investors. In this approach, security expected returns are determined by both risk and misvaluation. This survey sketches a framework for understanding decision biases, evaluates the a priori arguments(More)
Various theories have been proposed to explain momentum in stock returns. We test the gradual-information-diffusion model of Hong and Stein (1999) and establish three key results. First, once one moves past the very smallest stocks, the profitability of momentum strategies declines sharply with firm size. Second, holding size fixed, momentum strategies work(More)
We investigate the effect of scale on performance in the active money management industry. We first document that fund returns, both before and after fees and expenses, decline with lagged fund size, even after accounting for various performance benchmarks. We then explore a number of potential explanations for this relationship. This association is most(More)
We propose that stock-market participation is influenced by social interaction. In our model, any given “social” investor finds the market more attractive when more of his peers participate. We test this theory using data from the Health and Retirement Study, and find that social households—those who interact with their neighbors, or attend church—are(More)
Several theories of reputation and herd behavior (e.g., Scharfstein and Stein (1990), and Zwiebel (1995)) suggest that herding among agents should vary with career concerns. Our goal is to document whether such a link exists in the labor market for security analysts. We find that inexperienced analysts are more likely to be terminated for inaccurate(More)
We examine security analysts’career concerns by relating their earnings forecasts to job separations. Relatively accurate forecasters are more likely to experience favorable career outcomes like moving up to a high-status brokerage house. Controlling for accuracy, analysts who are optimistic relative to the consensus are more likely to experience favorable(More)