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- Hannes Leitgeb, Timothy Williamson, +12 authors Sonja Smets
- 2014

) In Logic across the University: Foundations and Application–Proceedings of the Tsinghua Logic Conference, Beijing, ed. J. van Benthem and F. Liu, 47–54. Volume 47: Studies in Logic. London: College Publications. Levi, Isaac. 1967. Gambling with Truth: An Essay on Induction and the Aims of Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.<lb>———. 1980. The Enterprise of… (More)

- Hanti Lin, Kevin T. Kelly
- J. Philosophical Logic
- 2012

This paper concerns the extent to which uncertain propositional reasoning can track probabilistic reasoning, and addresses kinematic problems that extend the familiar Lottery paradox. An acceptance rule assigns to each Bayesian credal state p a propositional belief revision method Bp, which specifies an initial belief state Bp(⊤), that is revised to the new… (More)

- Hanti Lin, Kevin T. Kelly
- Synthese
- 2012

We defend a set of acceptance rules that avoids the lottery paradox, that is closed under classical entailment, and that accepts uncertain propositions without ad hoc restrictions. We show that the rules we recommend provide a semantics that validates exactly Adams’ conditional logic and are exactly the rules that preserve a natural, logical structure over… (More)

- Hanti Lin
- 2013

Bayesians model one’s doxastic state by subjective probabilities. But in traditional epistemology, in logic-based artificial intelligence, and in everyday life, one’s doxastic state is usually expressed in a qualitative, binary way: either one accepts (believes) a proposition or one does not. What is the relationship between qualitative and probabilistic… (More)

- Franz Dietrich, Christian List, +8 authors Daniel Stoljar
- 2014

What is the relationship between degrees of belief and (all-or-nothing) beliefs? Can the latter be expressed as a function of the former, without running into paradoxes? We reassess this “belief-binarization” problem from the perspective of judgmentaggregation theory. Although some similarities between belief binarization and judgment aggregation have been… (More)

- Luc Bovens, Kenny Easwaran, +4 authors Jonah Schupbach
- 2015

In this paper, we compare and contrast two methods for revising qualitative (viz., “full”) beliefs. The first method is a naïve Bayesian one, which operates via conditionalization and the minimization of expected inaccuracy. The second method is the AGM approach to belief revision. Our aim here is to provide the most straightforward explanation of the ways… (More)

- Kevin T. Kelly, Hanti Lin
- 2011

“Luminosity” with respect to knowledge means that whenever one has knowledge, one is in a position to know that one has knowledge. Timothy Williamson has a well-known, sorites-like argument, based on the safety requirement for knowledge, for the surprising conclusion that we do not know what we know in ordinary perceptual circumstances (2000). Safety is the… (More)

- Hanti Lin
- LORI
- 2017

- Kevin T. Kelly, Hanti Lin
- 2011

We defend a set of acceptance rules that avoids the lottery paradox, that is closed under classical entailment, and that accepts uncertain propositions without ad hoc restrictions. We show that the rules we recommend provide a semantics that validates exactly Adams’ conditional logic and are exactly the rules that preserve a natural, logical structure over… (More)