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The selectope of a cooperative transferable utility game is the convex hull of the payo ̈ vectors obtained by assigning the Harsanyi dividends of the coalitions to members determined by so-called selectors. The selectope is studied from a set-theoretic point of view, as superset of the core and of the Weber set; and from a value-theoretic point of view, as(More)
This paper is concerned with the question of how to de ne the core when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face a nite sequence of exogenously speci ed TU-games. Three di erent core concepts are presented: the classical core, the strong sequential core and the weak sequential core.(More)
OBJECTIVES The objective was to develop the Audiological Disabilities Preference Index (ADPI), a measure to determine health state preferences associated with audiological disabilities. The ADPI consists of a hearing-related health state description, hearing-related health state valuation, and transformation of the latter to the overall health scale.(More)
Besides the two axial fibers and the mass of cribellum fibrils, a third component is present in the capture threads of uloborids. This is a substructure originating from the paracribellum. It probably helps to fasten the axial fibers in their position. The axial fibers are secreted from the two glandulae pseudoflagelliformes whose spigots are situated on(More)
This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous social choice function is manipulable. The lower bound is derived when there are three alternatives to choose from. Examples of social choice functions attaining the lower bound are given. We conjecture that these examples are in fact all minimally manipulable(More)
Collective decision problems are considered with a finite number of agents who have single-peaked preferences on the real line. A probabilistic decision scheme assigns a probability distribution over the real line to every profile of reported preferences. The main result of the paper is a characterization of the class of unanimous and strategy-proof(More)
We characterize all n-person multi-valued bargaining solutions, defined on the domain of all finite bargaining problems, and satisfying Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Covariance (COV), and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). We show that these solutions are obtained by iteratively maximizing nonsymmetric Nash products and determining the final set(More)